Standing Committee A

[Mr. Alan Hurst in the Chair]

Planning and Compulsory Purchase (Re-committed) Bill

New clause 7 - Special provision for certain circumstances where disclosure of information as to national security may occur

'(1) In section 321 of the principal Act (planning inquiries to be held in public subject to certain exceptions) after subsection (4) there are inserted the following subsections— 
 ''(5) If the Secretary of State is considering giving a direction under subsection (3) the Attorney General may appoint a person to represent the interests of any person who will be prevented from hearing or inspecting any evidence at a local inquiry if the direction is given. 
 (6) A person appointed under subsection (5) must have a general qualification for the purposes of section 71 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (c.41). 
 (7) The Lord Chancellor may by rules make provision— 
 (a) as to the procedure to be followed by the Secretary of State before he gives a direction under subsection (3) in a case where a person has been appointed under subsection (5); 
 (b) as to the functions of such a person. 
 (8) Rules made under subsection (7) must be contained in a statutory instrument subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.'' 
 (2) In Schedule 3 to the listed buildings Act (determination of certain appeals by person appointed by the Secretary of State), in paragraph 6, after subparagraph (7) there are inserted the following subparagraphs— 
 ''(7A) If the Secretary of State is considering giving a direction under subparagraph (6) the Attorney General may appoint a person to represent the interests of any person who will be prevented from hearing or inspecting any evidence at a local inquiry if the direction is given. 
 (7B) A person appointed under subparagraph (7A) must have a general qualification for the purposes of section 71 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (c.41). 
 (7C) The Lord Chancellor may by rules make provision— 
 (a) as to the procedure to be followed by the Secretary of State before he gives a direction under subparagraph (6) in a case where a person has been appointed under subparagraph (7A); 
 (b) as to the functions of such a person. 
 (7D) Rules made under subparagraph (7C) must be contained in a statutory instrument subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.'' 
 (3) In the Schedule to the hazardous substances Act, in paragraph 6, after subparagraph (7) there are inserted the following subparagraphs— 
 ''(7A) If the Secretary of State is considering giving a direction under subparagraph (6) the Attorney General may appoint a person to represent the interests of any person who will be prevented from hearing or inspecting any evidence at a local inquiry if the direction is given. 
 (7B) A person appointed under subparagraph (7A) must have a general qualification for the purposes of section 71 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (c.41). 
 (7C) The Lord Chancellor may by rules make provision— 
 (a) as to the procedure to be followed by the Secretary of State before he gives a direction under subparagraph (6) 
in a case where a person has been appointed under subparagraph (7A); 
 (b) as to the functions of such a person. 
 (7D) Rules made under subparagraph (7C) must be contained in a statutory instrument subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.''.'.—[Keith Hill.]
 Brought up, and read the First time. 
 Question proposed [this day], That the clause be read a Second time. 
 Question again proposed.

Alan Hurst: I remind the Committee that with this we are taking the following:
 Government new clause 8—Special provision in relation to planning inquiries: Wales. 
 Government new clause 40—Special provision for certain circumstances where disclosure of information as to national security may occur: Scotland.

Keith Hill: When we finished this morning, I was considering the group of amendments headed by new clause 7 and was responding to two questions asked by the hon. Member for Isle of Wight (Mr. Turner). The Committee will recall that he asked, first, whether the application of the new clause was broader than the application of current legislation. The answer is yes. The considerations that will apply are now national security and the security of premises and properties. Both considerations may invoke a section 321(4) procedure. Secondly, he asked whether it were possible for a public inquiry to be split between a public and a private part. The answer again is yes; the details of that appear in the inquiry procedure rules.
 The hon. Member for Ludlow (Matthew Green) asked about secret developments that are visible. The answer is that we expect applications for such manifest developments, but they will also be subject to section 321 direction. 
 The hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Sir Sydney Chapman) asked about the application of human rights legislation to the proposals. I assure him that we believe that the proposals are human rights compliant. Indeed, he will recall that Ministers are required to make such a declaration in introducing all proposed legislation. 
 Finally, I must say a few words about the application of the amendments to Scotland. I fear that in this morning's debate I rather glossed over the Government amendments that apply to Scotland. I should like to make it clear that the substantive Scottish amendments—new clauses 41 and 45 and new schedule 3—parallel the equivalent parts of the English amendments, new clauses 6 and 16 and new schedule 1, and have a similar effect in Scotland, taking into account the differences in Scottish legislation. I hope that I have dealt with all the points raised by hon. Members. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 8 - Special provision in relation to

'(1) After section 321 of the principal Act (planning inquiries to be held in public subject to certain exceptions) there is inserted the following section— 
 ''321A Special provision in relation to planning inquiries: Wales 
 (1) This section applies if the matter in respect of which a local inquiry to which section 321 applies is to be held relates to Wales. 
 (2) The reference in section 321(5) to the Attorney General must be read as a reference to the Counsel General to the National Assembly for Wales. 
 (3) The Assembly may by regulations make provision as mentioned in section 321(7) in connection with a local inquiry to which this section applies. 
 (4) If the Assembly acts under subsection (3) rules made by the Lord Chancellor under section 321(7) do not have effect in relation to the inquiry. 
 (5) The Counsel General to the National Assembly for Wales is the person appointed by the Assembly to be its chief legal adviser (whether or not he is known by that title). 
 (6) Section 333(3) does not apply to regulations made under subsection (4).'' 
 (2) In Schedule 3 to the listed buildings Act (determination of certain appeals by person appointed by the Secretary of State), after paragraph 7 there is inserted the following paragraph— 
 ''Local inquiries: Wales 
 8 (1) This paragraph applies in relation to a local inquiry held in pursuance of this Schedule if the matter in respect of which the inquiry is to be held relates to Wales. 
 (2) The reference in paragraph 6(7A) to the Attorney General must be read as a reference to the Counsel General to the National Assembly for Wales. 
 (3) The Assembly may by regulations make provision as mentioned in paragraph 6(7C) in connection with a local inquiry to which this section applies. 
 (4) If the Assembly acts under subparagraph (3) rules made by the Lord Chancellor under paragraph 6(7C) do not have effect in relation to the inquiry. 
 (5) The Counsel General to the National Assembly for Wales is the person appointed by the Assembly to be its chief legal adviser (whether or not he is known by that title). 
 (6) Section 93(3) does not apply to regulations made under this paragraph.'' 
 (3) In the Schedule to the hazardous substances Act, after paragraph 7 there is inserted the following paragraph— 
 ''Local inquiries: Wales 
 8 (1) This paragraph applies in relation to a local inquiry held in pursuance of this Schedule if the matter in respect of which the inquiry is to be held relates to Wales. 
 (2) The reference in paragraph 6(7A) to the Attorney General must be read as a reference to the Counsel General to the National Assembly for Wales. 
 (3) The Assembly may by regulations make provision as mentioned in paragraph 6(7C) in connection with a local inquiry to which this section applies. 
 (4) If the Assembly acts under subparagraph (3) rules made by the Lord Chancellor under paragraph 6(7C) do not have effect in relation to the inquiry. 
 (5) The Counsel General to the National Assembly for Wales is the person appointed by the Assembly to be its chief legal adviser (whether or not he is known by that title). 
 (6) Section 40(3) does not apply to regulations made under this paragraph.''.'.—[Keith Hill.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 9 - Urgent Crown development

'(1) Before section 294 of the principal Act (special enforcement notices in relation to development on Crown land) there is inserted the following section— 
 ''293A Urgent Crown development: application 
 (1) This section applies to a development if the appropriate authority certifies— 
 (a) that the development is of national importance, and 
 (b) that it is necessary that the development is carried out as a matter of urgency. 
 (2) The appropriate authority may, instead of making an application for planning permission to the local planning authority in accordance with Part 3, make an application for planning permission to the Secretary of State under this section. 
 (3) If the appropriate authority proposes to make the application to the Secretary of State it must publish in one or more newspapers circulating in the locality of the proposed development a notice— 
 (a) describing the proposed development, and 
 (b) stating that the authority proposes to make the application to the Secretary of State. 
 (4) For the purposes of an application under this section the appropriate authority must provide to the Secretary of State— 
 (a) any matter required to be provided by an applicant for planning permission in pursuance of regulations made under section 71A; 
 (b) a statement of the authority's grounds for making the application. 
 (5) If the appropriate authority makes an application under this section subsections (6) to (9) below apply. 
 (6) The Secretary of State may require the authority to provide him with such further information as he thinks necessary to enable him to determine the application. 
 (7) As soon as practicable after he is provided with any document or other matter in pursuance of subsection (4) or (6) the Secretary of State must make a copy of the document or other matter available for inspection by the public in the locality of the proposed development. 
 (8) The Secretary of State must in accordance with such requirements as may be prescribed publish notice of the application and of the fact that such documents and other material are available for inspection. 
 (9) The Secretary of State must consult— 
 (a) the local planning authority for the area to which the proposed development relates, and 
 (b) such other persons as may be prescribed, 
 about the application. 
 (10) Subsections (4) to (7) of section 77 apply to an application under this section as they apply to an application in respect of which a direction under section 77 has effect.'' 
 (2) In section 284 of the principal Act (validity of certain matters) in subsection (3) at the end there is inserted the following paragraph— 
 ''(i) any decision on an application for planning permission under section 293A.''.'.—[Keith Hill.]
 Brought up, and read the First time.

Keith Hill: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Government new clause 10—Urgent works relating to Crown land. 
 Government new clause 38—Urgent Crown development: Scotland. 
 Government new clause 39—Urgent works relating to Crown land: Scotland.

Keith Hill: New clauses 9 and 10 contain the urgency procedures for Crown applications. New clause 9 inserts new section 293A, which applies to applications for planning permission. New clause 10, which is almost identical in effect, inserts new section 82B, which applies to applications under the listed buildings Act for works to buildings on Crown land.
 I shall talk first about the circumstances in which the urgency procedure might be invoked, and then go through the provisions to describe how they will work. My remarks will be based mainly on new clause 9. 
 From time to time, the Crown—this will generally be Government Departments—proposes a nationally important development, the building of which is required more quickly than the normal procedures would permit. If the local planning authority is expected to approve the application, the appropriate authority will apply to it in the usual way and hope for a favourable decision within eight weeks. Difficulties arise with further-reaching or more controversial developments that the local planning authority is expected to refuse, which would lead to a public inquiry on appeal. 
 There are two ways of making significant savings in the time taken to process a planning application that the local planning authority might be expected to refuse. The first is visible in subsection (2) of new section 293A. Allowing the appropriate authority to make such an application directly to the Secretary of State eliminates the eight weeks that local planning authorities are allowed to determine an application, the time that it would take an applicant to appeal against refusal and the time that it would take the Secretary of State to recover the appeal under section 78. Instead, there is, in effect, an instant calling in under section 77. 
 The second way of saving time is hidden away among the implications of subsection (10) of new section 293A. Section 77(5), which is applied by subsection (10), entitles the parties to be heard at a public inquiry. Under section 77 and, by extension, new section 293A, public inquiries are governed by the Government's inquiry procedure rules, which will be amended in relation to applications made under the provisions to provide a shorter period between the start date, when the Secretary of State has all the information that he needs, and the start of the inquiry. 
 The period that is usually allowed is 22 weeks. We will consult on what the shorter period should be. Our aim is to have the shortest period consistent with giving the objector sufficient time to consider the appropriate authority's case and to prepare his own case. Our thinking is that 14 weeks, rather than 22 weeks, would be acceptable. The total time saved could therefore be about 18 weeks, 10 of which would be taken up in applying to the Secretary of State instead of waiting for refusal and appeal. Eight weeks would be taken from the lead-in to the inquiry. In other words, we expect the time from formal 
 application to the Secretary of State to the beginning of the public inquiry to be 14 weeks—three and a half months—instead of 32 weeks, as under the usual arrangements. 
 The bulk of new sections 293A and 82B deals with the advertisement of the application, the provision of information, making that information available, and consultation. Most of this is self-explanatory, so I shall touch only on a couple of points that need clarification. 
 As set out in new section 293A(4)(a), the regulations made under section 71A of the principal Act deal with the environmental impact assessment. This means that if the development requires an environmental statement, that statement should be provided to the Secretary of State at the outset. This provision is absent from new section 82B(4) in new clause 10 because environmental statements are not required for listed building consent or conservation area consent. 
 In new section 293A(9)(b), the Secretary of State must consult certain prescribed persons as well as the local planning authority. Those persons would be statutory consultees, such as the highway authority, for example, if the development affected a highway. 
 New clause 9(2) is a consequential amendment that adds decisions on section 293A applications to the list of decisions taken by the Secretary of State in section 284(3) that will not be questioned in any legal proceedings, save under section 288. The list already includes decisions on call-ins under section 77 and recovered appeals under section 78. 
 The system that the new clauses create could deliver a decision on a controversial application in about seven months, rather than 11 months, from the start date to the conclusion of the inquiry. However, members of the Committee may well be wondering what we propose for Crown development that is required more or less immediately. We propose a new permitted development right in the general permitted development order for developments that are so urgent that they cannot wait for planning permission to be granted. That will enable the Crown to undertake what we might call emergency development whenever it is required, but with the proviso that it must be followed by a planning application within a certain time—possibly within six months, but we intend to consult on that. 
 Finally, the Committee will have noticed that there is no provision for an urgency procedure for hazardous substances consent. That is because we cannot envisage a situation where the Crown would want such consent independently of a planning application for the storage facilities. We have therefore not provided an urgency procedure in relation to the hazardous substances Act. I ought to point out that new clauses 38 and 39 make the same changes to the equivalent Scottish legislation. The amendments take account of the fact that applications under those procedures will be made to the Scottish Ministers; and the Scottish Executive will be considering changes to subordinate legislation along the lines that I have indicated for England and Wales. 
 I believe that that completes the picture on urgent applications.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: At the outset, and before getting into the detail of the new clauses, the Minister said nothing about how to define the conditions in new section 293A. They are, in subsection (1)(a),
''that the development is of national importance'',
 and, in subsection (1)(b), 
''that it is necessary that the development is carried out as a matter of urgency.''
 My worry is that all controversial applications will somehow fall into that category, and that will allow the expedited procedure to take place without the need to make a full planning application. We have a planning system, and, as we discussed this morning, we are going to bind the Crown to it. It therefore seems that the overwhelming expectation would be that planning applications should be made. 
 The Minister said this morning that the procedure would be followed only if the local planning authority expected to approve an application. If an application is controversial, how will the authority know whether it is about to approve it? The planning officers may make a recommendation, but the planning committee may take a different view. We need to hear a little more about how the Minister intends to stop Departments using the provision as a convenient mechanism to circumvent the planning system. 
 As the Minister said, the urgent procedure can be put into effect through different mechanisms. At the end of his speech, he mentioned permitted development rights for urgent matters. I would rather that the procedure was followed in almost every case, because retrospective planning permission would have to be given after the permitted development right was carried out. At least the matter could then be examined in public. Some might say that it would be too late, but at least it would be publicly examined by the local planning authority. My worry is that, for controversial applications that use either the Secretary of State call-in procedure or what I call the section 293A procedure, local people—those who might be most affected by large controversial applications—will not have the opportunity to make proper representations. 
 I refer the Minister to subsection (9)(b), which provides that the Secretary of State must consult 
''such other persons as may be prescribed''.
 The only ''such other persons'' that the Minister mentioned was the highway authority. Normal planning law refers to a number of other statutory consultees, which I would expect to be consulted if it were relevant, such as the Environment Agency, English Nature, English Heritage and the Countryside Agency. Will the Minister confirm that, were it relevant, those other bodies would be consulted? 
 I am more concerned than that, however. I do not see how local people are to be consulted or how they 
 can give their views under the Secretary of State procedure. That is important, particularly as we are trying to make the planning procedure more democratic and open. 
 I am puzzled as to why we need to follow the procedures, set out in new clause 4, in relation to listed buildings. Why should the Crown be in a different position from anyone else? If the property is being looked after, there should not be an urgent need to change the procedures. The property should have been properly maintained and the normal planning procedure should have been followed. We are back to what was said this morning: on the one hand we are binding the Crown, but on the other we are allowing it to get out of other things when it suits us. That is curious. 
 New clauses 38 and 39 apply the same principles to Scotland, and I have no questions in relation to them. The issues are complicated, so I would say to the Minister that we do not want to use these heavy-handed clauses except when it is strictly necessary. I did not gain anything from the Minister's explanation. Will he expand on what is meant by matters of national importance and matters of urgency?

Matthew Green: I, too, have considerable concerns about the definition of national importance. My thoughts turned immediately to a crisis such as foot and mouth disease, and the necessity to dig burial pits on Crown land, which previously did not require planning permission, but now would. However, I understand from the Minister that extra-urgent cases would come under permitted development. It clearly would not take seven months to get permission to dig large pits for the burial of animal carcases, so what development of national importance would require an 18-week gain? It struck me that there might be issues of national security that needed to be dealt with quickly. That brought me back to the previous clause, and I should like the Minister to confirm that an application could be urgent and could also come under new clause 7—an urgent application could be made, and the Government could appoint a lawyer to speak on behalf of objectors. If an application were processed quickly and people were not able to know a great deal about it, there could be problems. I should like the Minister's confirmation that the two clauses can apply concurrently.
 The other point is that there is little in the clause to cover how people can object and, more importantly, how they are to find out about an application. Potential objectors often take some time to realise the implications of a planning application. There is a case in my constituency concerning a council that has spent two years planning a new business park—I would not want the Minister to comment on it; it will probably end up on his desk anyway. Going by the objectors' letters, most of them only spotted the application in the last month so, although the council went about it in an open and accountable way, one would imagine that the plan is being rushed through. 
 My concern is that, with the faster procedure, many members of the public will believe that their views have no weight. If the procedure is to bypass the initial stages—the warning stages for many people—and if the calling in is to happen early, because it was going to be called in anyway, objectors will not have time to put their cases together. Extra steps should be taken in those instances to ensure that people are aware of the scale of any application and of any reasons to object to it. Presumably, people will still have a right of objection because they will be able to write to the Secretary of State outlining their views and perhaps to appear at the quickened public inquiry. 
 In seeking to be helpful, we need to consider whether, when the Government need some planning permission quickly, they have created a situation whereby people's rights to object to a planning application have been trodden all over, and whether we need some safeguards to ensure that people are aware of what is planned on their doorsteps.

Sydney Chapman: I shall make three comments on the four new clauses. First, I share the concern of my hon. Friend the Member for Cotswold (Mr. Clifton-Brown) about the possible abuse of urgency procedure. I am yet to come across a situation where someone builds without planning permission and subsequently finds out that planning permission is needed—although that can be done accidentally. However, I suggest that that is not possible on significant applications. In my years of experience I can think of only a handful of cases in which retrospective application has not been granted, and I can think of no possible situation in which the case is claimed to be matter of urgency or national importance, yet the Secretary of State, who would presumably be part of the Department that needed to effect such works in the national interest, would be likely to turn it down. It is stretching naivety to say that we do not know that the provisions are giving a sweeping power to the Secretary of State.
 Secondly, although I stand to be corrected if I am wrong, I firmly believe that the Secretary of State already has the power to call in any planning application for determination by himself, albeit after a planning inquiry. If so, why do we need to have added provisions under which the person who wants the development can go straight to the Secretary of State? Ministers talk to each other, so surely the Department can put the application to the local planning authority. The Secretary of State will know that it has been put and can therefore call the application in for determination in a shorter rather than a longer time. I merely ask the Committee to remember the existing situation, because a complication might be prevented if the Government were to use the existing provisions rather than new ones. However, I accept that such matters are complicated, and that I may have missed a point. 
 Thirdly, the purpose of the Bill, as I understand it, is to speed up the planning system where that can be done within reason. The Minister will assure us—and I shall accept what he says—that the purpose of the Bill is to speed up the planning process, without taking 
 away fairness, be that fairness to the applicant or fairness to third parties. We must get the balance right. 
 The Minister explained how under the current proposals the time that it takes for a planning decision on a significant application to be taken could probably be reduced from almost a year to 14 weeks. I am persuaded that in those exceptional circumstances, it is quite reasonable to expect third parties to make representations within the time frame suggested by the Minister, after consultation with the appropriate bodies. However, we may question later whether the Government are trying to speed up the planning system too arbitrarily and unfairly. In my view, the Government have got it right on this occasion and in this context, but I remain concerned about Departments' ability to use the new legislation, if it goes through, to claim that almost anything is urgent or of national importance.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: My hon. Friend has a good point. The Secretary of State has the power to call in applications. Surely the normal expectation would be that a proper planning application is made, that all the statutory consultees are consulted, and that local people are able to give their views in the usual way. The Secretary of State has the power to call in an application either before or after a decision is made by the local planning authority. He already has huge powers. Would my hon. Friend agree that the normal expectation would be to go through the local planning process rather than the new procedure?

Sydney Chapman: That is a fair point; indeed, it is the one that I was trying to make. Why should we not keep the present system and adapt it as necessary, rather than introducing an automatic right to go to the Secretary of State, who presumably would then have the responsibility of seeing that the application was published in newspapers, thus giving it publicity? I would be interested to hear whether the Minister, on reflection, feels that he could adapt the present situation rather than introducing a new procedure.

Keith Hill: We have had an important debate, in which hon. Members have raised proper concerns about civil liberties. If such considerations cannot be raised in this place it is difficult to know where else it would be appropriate to raise them, and I respect the concerns and observations made by my colleagues.
 As I said before—it was almost an ex cathedra utterance—in all such matters we expect Crown bodies to adhere as far as possible to the letter and the spirit of the law. They are Crown bodies; no other bodies should better observe and more greatly respect the law, and we expect that respect to inform all their actions. Although we understand the concerns that have been expressed about potential abuse, we expect proper observance of the law in all circumstances. 
 I shall deal next with some of the specific points raised by my colleagues in the course of our exchanges.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I take to heart what the Minister has just said, but I am sure that he will know from his long political experience—as I do from my 12 years' experience as a Member of Parliament—that the bigger the organisation, the more difficult it is to get it to change its mind. That is where Departments
 go wrong. If a Department were determined about a particular application, it would use this procedure-—and it would be very difficult for the ordinary citizen to get it to change its mind. I worry about the whole procedure. Despite what the Minister said—and he is absolutely right to say that Departments should uphold the law—I am still suspicious that Departments will use the procedure for the sake of expediency, even when it is not strictly necessary.

Keith Hill: I have two immediate responses to the hon. Gentleman's point. The first is that any decision taken in this process is subject to judicial review and is therefore subject to the usual processes of the law. The second response is that, notwithstanding the expedited procedure, we are still considering a full procedure whereby objectors can make representations and in which there will be adequate time for them to do so, so there are safeguards.
 The hon. Member for Cotswold asked about the definition of urgency and the importance of a proposed development. As the amendment indicates, it is up to the applicant Department to exercise that judgment and to take that decision, but I reiterate that any such decision or judgment is subject to judicial review and the rigours of the law. 
 The hon. Gentleman also asked about statutory consultees. I reassure him that other statutory consultees must be approached. I cited the example of the Highways Agency, but that is only one such example. We expect those statutory consultees to be specified in regulation. 
 The hon. Gentleman was also exercised about the inclusion of listed buildings in the provisions. We included listed buildings to allow for the possibility that it may be necessary to carry out such urgent works, although we do not expect there to be many such occasions. I am not entirely sure that I can wholly disclose the source of my information on such matters, but in an immediately previous incarnation I had responsibility for the security of the buildings that we are now in. The Committee will remember that certain works were implemented in these buildings immediately after 11 September 2001. Barriers were installed, and new arrangements were later put in place in New Palace Yard. I believe that all members of the Committee would agree that the Palace of Westminster is a listed building, but that those were urgent works and it was absolutely right and proper to carry them out at the earliest opportunity. 
 I now revert to my proposition that we expect all Crown bodies to adhere as far as possible to the letter and spirit of the law, because I also happen to know that the House authorities also fully consulted English Heritage and Westminster council, so we can see that such bodies do try to observe the proper procedures and to consult appropriately. We expect that with regard to every measure, whether it relates to secret developments or urgent ones. 
 Hon. Gentlemen may have asked if the provisions are to be used when the local authority is expected to 
 approve an application. No, of course not. They are used during the pre-application discussion—which, although I am a novice in these areas, I understand is absolutely normal—when it becomes apparent that an objection is likely. Nevertheless, I reiterate that an equal and lengthy process is envisaged in relation to these procedures. Local people will have the opportunity to make representations. Indeed, they will have three and a half months to object, to get their representations together and to proceed to an inquiry. In that sense, nobody could reasonably argue that rights are being trodden all over, to quote the hon. Member for Ludlow, to whom I shall return in due course.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: Will the Minister clarify something that he said? He mentioned pre-application discussion, which is an important issue because it has wide connotations within the Bill. The discussion normally takes place with the officers of a local planning authority—but planning committees sometimes overrule the decisions of their officers, even when they have made strong recommendations. A Crown body might believe that planning permission was to be granted, but that advice would not bind the committee. What would happen in that case? If the committee turned the application down, would the Crown body immediately revert to using this procedure?

Keith Hill: I fear that the occurrence that the hon. Gentleman identifies is a common one, in that the officers of a local planning authority might propose, but it is up to elected members, protecting the desires of the local community, to dispose. It happens that officers' recommendations are overturned. However, there is a limit to ''whatifery'' in this situation. We are envisaging developments of some dimension. I do not want to encourage discussion of the examples that I might be tempted to place before the Committee—but let me whisper that if, for example, the Ministry of Defence were to propose the installation of training facilities for a new weapons system, planning officers would have a sense of how their committee members were likely to respond. If we were considering, say, the extension of a runway at an air base, local planning officers would be likely to be able to report the feelings of the local community if those feelings were not evident from other sources. Finally, I risk going down a dangerous path in saying that if the Home Office were to propose a new or extended detention facility, from prison downwards, it would be pretty apparent what local opinion was likely to be. The short answer is that we would expect common sense to prevail and the correct judgment to be made about local sensitivities in a sensitive situation. With regard to pre-application discussions with officers, the normal Crown body appeals procedures apply.
 The hon. Member for Ludlow asked me to confirm whether an application could both be urgent and come under the provisions of new clause 7. The answer is yes, it could. The hon. Gentleman raised legitimate concerns about the involvement of local communities when he asked how people could be expected to find out about an application. Without being flippant, however, I have to say that if it were a secret 
 development we would not expect them to do so; we have discussed that already. We have set out both here and in previous debates the procedure that would be adopted in situations involving national security.

Matthew Green: May I take the Minister back to his hypothesis that plans for a new prison or detention centre might be expected to be refused by a local authority and would therefore be fast-tracked. Not all aspects of a new prison would necessarily need to be secret. If an application goes through the normal planning procedure, it is published in the local press and plans are lodged with the local council. In such circumstances, members of the public can see what is proposed. If that initial stage is removed and applications go straight off to the Secretary of State, what steps will then he take to ensure that the public have access to the plans and can discover their scale and extent, so that they can raise reasoned objections, rather than simply saying, ''I don't want it because it's next door to me.''

Keith Hill: Let me remind the hon. Gentleman of our earlier debate on proposed new section 293A. Local people will know about proposed developments because they will see notification of the planning application. New section 293A also includes an advertising provision. Subsection (3) deals with applications in connection with such developments, and subsection (8) deals with the provision of documentation. I reiterate that there will be an initial period of three and a half months during which representations can be made.
 The hon. Member for Chipping Barnet expressed understandable anxiety about sweeping powers being introduced and the possibility of their being abused. We should remember that the Secretary of State has call-in powers, and that we need the expedited process precisely because it will be needed in situations of national urgency and security. We still expect the whole process to be fairly lengthy—but it will be seven months, not 11. I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman's general support for the proposals. 
 I have dealt with most of the issues that have been raised during this important debate, and I again urge the Committee to support the new clauses. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 10 - Urgent works relating to Crown land

'(1) After section 82A of the listed buildings Act (inserted by section (Crown application of planning Acts)(2)) there is inserted the following section— 
 ''82B Urgent works relating to Crown land: application 
 (1) This section applies to any works proposed to be executed in connection with any building which is on Crown land if the appropriate authority certifies— 
 (a) that the works are of national importance, and 
 (b) that it is necessary that the works are carried out as a matter of urgency. 
 (2) The appropriate authority may, instead of making an application for consent to the local planning authority in accordance with this Act, make an application for consent to the Secretary of State under this section. 
 (3) If the appropriate authority proposes to make the application to the Secretary of State it must publish in one or more newspapers circulating in the locality of the building a notice— 
 (a) describing the proposed works, and 
 (b) stating that the authority proposes to make the application to the Secretary of State. 
 (4) For the purposes of an application under this section the appropriate authority must provide to the Secretary of State a statement of the authority's grounds for making the application. 
 (5) If the appropriate authority makes an application under this section subsections (6) to (9) below apply. 
 (6) The Secretary of State may require the authority to provide him with such further information as he thinks necessary to enable him to determine the application. 
 (7) As soon as practicable after he is provided with any document or other matter in pursuance of subsection (4) or (6) the Secretary of State must make a copy of the document or other matter available for inspection by the public in the locality of the proposed development. 
 (8) The Secretary of State must in accordance with such requirements as may be prescribed publish notice of the application and of the fact that such documents and other material are available for inspection. 
 (9) The Secretary of State must consult— 
 (a) the local planning authority for the area to which the proposed development relates, and 
 (b) such other persons as may be prescribed, 
 about the application. 
 (10) Subsections (4) and (5) of section 12 apply to an application under this section as they apply to an application in respect of which a direction under section 12 has effect.'' 
 (2) In section 62 of the listed buildings Act (validity of certain matters) in subsection (2) at the end there is inserted the following paragraph— 
 ''(d) any decision on an application for listed building consent under section 82B.''.'. 
 —[Keith Hill.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 11 - Enforcement in relation to Crown land

'(1) Section 296 of the principal Act (exercise of powers in relation to Crown land) is omitted. 
 (2) After section 296 there are inserted the following sections— 
 ''296A Enforcement in relation to the Crown 
 (1) No act or omission done or suffered by or on behalf of the Crown constitutes an offence under this Act. 
 (2) A local planning authority must not take any step for the purposes of enforcement in relation to Crown land unless it has the consent of the appropriate authority. 
 (3) The appropriate authority may give consent under subsection (2) subject to such conditions as it thinks appropriate. 
 (4) A step taken for the purposes of enforcement is anything done in connection with the enforcement of anything required to be done or prohibited by or under this Act. 
 (5) A step taken for the purposes of enforcement includes— 
 (a) entering land; 
 (b) bringing proceedings; 
 (c) the making of an application. 
 (6) A step taken for the purposes of enforcement does not include— 
 (a) service of a notice; 
 (b) the making of an order (other than by a court). 
 296B References to an interest in land 
 (1) Subsection (2) applies to the extent that an interest in land is a Crown interest or a Duchy interest. 
 (2) Anything which requires or is permitted to be done by or in relation to the owner of the interest in land must be done by or in relation to the appropriate authority. 
 (3) An interest in land includes an interest only as occupier of the land.'' 
 (3) After section 82C of the listed buildings Act (inserted by Schedule (Crown application)) there are inserted the following sections— 
 ''82D Enforcement in relation to the Crown 
 (1) No act or omission done or suffered by or on behalf of the Crown constitutes an offence under this Act. 
 (2) A local planning authority must not take any step for the purposes of enforcement in relation to Crown land unless it has the consent of the appropriate authority. 
 (3) The appropriate authority may give consent under subsection (2) subject to such conditions as it thinks appropriate. 
 (4) A step taken for the purposes of enforcement is anything done in connection with the enforcement of anything required to be done or prohibited by or under this Act. 
 (5) A step taken for the purposes of enforcement includes— 
 (a) entering land; 
 (b) bringing proceedings; 
 (c) the making of an application. 
 (6) A step taken for the purposes of enforcement does not include— 
 (a) service of a notice; 
 (b) the making of an order (other than by a court). 
 82E References to an interest in land 
 (1) Subsection (2) applies to the extent that an interest in land is a Crown interest or a Duchy interest. 
 (2) Anything which requires or is permitted to be done by or in relation to the owner of the interest in land must be done by or in relation to the appropriate authority. 
 (3) An interest in land includes an interest only as occupier of the land.'' 
 (4) After section 30B of the hazardous substances Act (inserted by section (Crown application of planning Acts)(3)) there are inserted the following sections— 
 ''30C Enforcement in relation to the Crown 
 (1) No act or omission done or suffered by or on behalf of the Crown constitutes an offence under this Act. 
 (2) A local planning authority must not take any step for the purposes of enforcement in relation to Crown land unless it has the consent of the appropriate authority. 
 (3) The appropriate authority may give consent under subsection (2) subject to such conditions as it thinks appropriate. 
 (4) A step taken for the purposes of enforcement is anything done in connection with the enforcement of anything required to be done or prohibited by or under this Act. 
 (5) A step taken for the purposes of enforcement includes— 
 (a) entering land; 
 (b) bringing proceedings; 
 (c) the making of an application. 
 (6) A step taken for the purposes of enforcement does not include— 
 (a) service of a notice; 
 (b) the making of an order (other than by a court). 
 30D References to an interest in land 
 (1) Subsection (2) applies to the extent that an interest in land is a Crown interest or a Duchy interest. 
 (2) Anything which requires or is permitted to be done by or in relation to the owner of the interest in land must be done by or in relation to the appropriate authority. 
 (3) An interest in land includes an interest only as occupier of the land.''.'.—[Yvette Cooper.]
 Brought up, and read the First time.

Yvette Cooper: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 37—Enforcement in relation to Crown land: Scotland.

Yvette Cooper: New clause 11 deals with enforcement in relation to Crown land, and new clause 37 makes the same provisions in Scottish planning legislation, but taking account of any differences in Scotland, such as the absence of Duchy land in relation to Crown immunity. The clauses are, at first sight, counter-intuitive. So far, we have set out the importance of removing Crown immunity in planning law so that, like everyone else, the Crown in its various guises must abide by the law—
 Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. 
 NIL Section 
 On resuming—

[Mr. Peter Pike in the Chair]

Yvette Cooper: I welcome you to the Committee, Mr. Pike. It is good to see you here.
 The overall intention of the Bill is to ensure that the Crown, in its various guises, is covered and abides by planning law. The new clause prevents local planning authorities from using the courts to force breaches of planning law by the Crown. It is important to set out the reasons for that. 
 Members will be aware that the legal position of the Crown has been distinctive for many centuries. The general rule in common law was that no civil or criminal proceedings could be brought against the monarch because the courts are the Queen's own and have no jurisdiction over her. On the civil side, much has changed. Following the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 and the Government's administrative law on judicial review, a wide range of Crown activities are subject to scrutiny by the courts. The general immunity from criminal prosecution remains. The Bill is about planning. It is not our intention to overturn our legal and constitutional tradition. Therefore, the Bill continues the tradition that no criminal proceedings can be brought against the Crown, or at least not without the Crown's permission. That is the purpose of proposed new section 296A, subsections (1) to (5). 
 However, given that the purpose of the provisions is to bring the Crown within planning law and how important it is that the Crown should be held to account for breaches of planning law—that is, illegal activity—subsection (6) plays an important role. It 
 makes it clear that local planning authorities can serve enforcement notices on the Crown, which has several consequences. 
 We can expect the Crown to comply with enforcement notices, be it a Department or Government agency or other agent of the Crown. Should such bodies fail to comply, they would be acting illegally and could be challenged by judicial review or brought before the ombudsman. Ministers would be held to account to Parliament and, of course, the media and public opinion would ensure accountability as well. In practice those are powerful motivators. Whether cases proceed through judicial review or the European Court of Human Rights, the Government and the agencies of the Crown have always tended to be swift to comply when found to be acting illegally in any way. 
 Finally, the interpretation of proposed new section 296B provides that enforcement notices should be served on the appropriate authority rather than the owner where there is Crown or Duchy interest. That is to prevent Her Majesty the Queen from being personally served with a series of notices that should be served, for example, on the Crown Estates Commissioners or another appropriate authority.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: Welcome to the Chair, Mr. Pike. I also welcome the Under-Secretary of State, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, the hon. Member for Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) to the Committee's proceedings.
 New clause 11 is another example of the Crown being treated differently. I understand that it is difficult to start serving criminal proceedings on the Secretary of State. One could imagine all sorts of possibilities, but as for notices, which I accept can be served under subsection (6), I think that on the whole the Crown ought to be subject to most provisions of the planning Acts and that there is not enough of a stick in relation to the Crown. 
 The Crown should never need to face the possibility of a local planning authority serving enforcement notices or taking steps for criminal proceedings. If the Minister for Housing and Planning is right that one could expect Departments to uphold the law to the highest possible extent, one would expect the relevant provision never to be used. If it is used, something must have gone pretty badly wrong, and if things have gone that badly wrong the Department ought to be subject to the full rigour of the law. I therefore have some difficulty with the new clause. 
 I would like clarification on new section 296B(1), which refers to 
''the extent that an interest in land is a Crown interest or a Duchy interest.''
 I assume that ''Crown interest'' includes Her Majesty's private estates, but the Bill does not explicitly say that and I wonder whether it should be put right. Other than those few comments, I am happy to let the new clause go through.

Matthew Green: I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Pike. I also welcome the Under-Secretary.
 I entirely see the point of the two new clauses. The protections are clearly consequential to ending Crown immunity. However, as I said in earlier debates, I can foresee a situation that might not be covered. We were discussing buildings that people did not know existed and planning applications made under new clause 7 where disclosure of information was restricted. If such a building or structure was constructed without planning permission, the local authority could slap on a notice of enforcement under new clause 11. That would be a public notice of enforcement. If the Ministry of Defence or the security services had failed to follow the provisions of new clause 7, they would be subject to the provisions of new clause 11. That might not be in the interests of national security. I wonder whether something has been left out of the proposal.

Yvette Cooper: The question is, why should the Crown be treated differently? I have already spoken about the constitutional, legal and historical tradition of the Crown being treated differently in the courts with regard to criminal proceedings and it is not the purpose of a planning Bill, which is about planning law, to overturn that tradition. We can certainly debate our constitutional tradition and the nature of the relationship between the Crown and the courts, but this is not the place to do so.
 I agree that the Crown should comply with the law, but that is what the Crown does and has done in all sorts of areas where it has been decided that the Crown has acted illegally. It is possible for enforcement notices to be served—perhaps for technical breaches of conditions or decisions taken by Government agencies about the land—and it is right that we should have the procedures in place to allow that. I am not entirely sure whether the hon. Member for Cotswold was arguing that we do not need such a provision because matters should never get that far or that we need considerably stronger provision. However, enforcement notices provide a clear and public statement, and that could apply in relation to the other proposals. 
 On the question whether the Crown interest applies to Her Majesty's private interests, I am advised that it does. That is set out in new schedule 1, which was discussed this morning. I am not aware of any gaps in the provisions of new clauses 11 and 37. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 12 - Tree preservation orders affecting land where Forestry Commissioners interested

'(1) Section 200 of the principal Act (orders affecting land where Forestry Commissioners interested) is amended as follows. 
 (2) In subsection (2)— 
 (a) after paragraph (a) leave out ''or''; 
 (b) after paragraph (b), there is inserted ''or 
 (c) it has been placed at their disposal.''. 
 (3) In subsection (3), leave out from ''in accordance with'' to the end and insert— 
 ''(a) in accordance with a plan of operations or other working plan approved by the Forestry Commissioners, and for the 
time being in force, under a forestry dedication covenant or under the conditions of a grant or loan made under section 1 of the Forestry Act 1979; 
 (b) by the Forestry Commissioners on land placed at their disposal.'' 
 (4) After subsection (4)(a)— 
 (a) leave out ''and''; 
 (b) insert the following paragraph— 
 ''(ab) land placed at the disposal of the Forestry Commissioners is land placed at their disposal under the Forestry Act 1967;''.'. 
 —[Keith Hill.]
 Brought up, and read the First time.

Keith Hill: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Peter Pike: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Government new clause 13—Trees in conservation areas: acts of Crown. 
 Government new clause 42—Tree preservation orders affecting land where Forestry Commissioners interested: Scotland. 
 Government new clause 43—Trees in conservation areas in Scotland: acts of Crown.

Keith Hill: These new clauses are concerned with trees in two specialised sets of circumstances. New clause 12 deals with tree preservation orders affecting land where the Forestry Commission has an interest. New clause 13 deals with acts of the Crown in connection with trees in conservation areas.
 Before speaking about the new clauses, it might help if I clear up a point that arose this morning on tree preservation orders—a passionate concern of the hon. Member for Cotswold. I would like to confirm that it will be possible for tree preservation orders to be made on Crown land, subject to the minor modifications that we are about to debate. The difficulty seems to have arisen from the repeal of section 300 of the principal Act, in paragraph 26 of new schedule 1. Section 300 deals with tree preservation orders in anticipation of disposal of Crown land. 
 That is currently required because the principal Act does not bind the Crown and sets out the special circumstances in which the local planning authority might make a tree preservation order. In brief, the circumstances are that if the land is to be sold by the Crown there ought to be a tree preservation order in place before that sale takes place to protect the woodland or other trees there. The Committee will understand that that provision is no longer necessary as local planning authorities will be able to make tree preservation orders on Crown land at any time. 
 Having offered what I hope is a helpful word of clarification, I shall now revert to new clause 12. The removal of Crown immunity will enable local planning authorities to make tree preservation orders on Crown land without the prior consent of the relevant Crown body. The Crown will therefore be subject to the usual requirements imposed by such orders, including the requirement to obtain the local planning authority's consent for felling or pruning works. Under the tree 
 preservation order legislation, the requirement to obtain a local authority's consent is disapplied in a number of circumstances—for example, where trees are dangerous or where felling has otherwise been approved by the Forestry Commission, either by felling licence or one of its woodland management schemes. 
 Accordingly, under section 200 of the principal Act, woodland management carried out by private individuals in accordance with the plan of operations approved by the Forestry Commission can proceed outside the controls of the tree preservation orders system. New clause 12 amends section 200 to ensure that forestry operations or woodland management carried out by the Forestry Commission is also not subject to those controls. That takes it into account that the commissioners make their felling and other management decisions in accordance with their duty under the Forestry Act 1967 to achieve a reasonable balance between forestry and conservation. 
 New clause 13 is a second new clause on trees and it adds four new subsections to the end of section 211 of the principal Act. It is another proposal that is difficult to follow because the beginning of the section to which it relates is not set out. I must therefore describe what existing subsections (1) and (3) of section 211 do, in the context of the enforcement provisions in new clause 11. Section 211 is concerned with trees in conservation areas that are not subject to tree preservation orders. Subsection (1) provides that it is an offence to do to such a tree anything that would be prohibited by a tree preservation order. However, subsection (3) provides a statutory defence. As we have seen in new clause 11, offences do not apply to the Crown, nor does any statutory defence. Accordingly, in place of both, new clause 13 prohibits the Crown from doing acts prohibited by subsection (1), unless the conditions in subsection (3) are met. 
 The result is that before an emanation of the Crown does anything to a tree in a conservation area that would be prohibited by a tree preservation order, it must first serve a notice on the local planning authority, setting out its proposals. In effect, the local planning authority has six weeks to respond. If it gives its consent within that period—consent has to be unconditional—all well and good. If the authority wishes to attach conditions to or prevent the work, it must make a tree preservation order. If the authority does not respond within a six-week period, the tree works may proceed. New clauses 42 and 43 make the same amendments to equivalent sections in the principal Scottish planning Act. The purpose and effect of the amendments in the Scottish context are as I described for England and Wales.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: It seems to me that new clause 12 is a tidying-up clause to allow the Forestry Commission to carry out its usual operations. I have never heard of a case in which it has been hindered by a tree preservation order, and I do not know whether the Minister knows of any such case. I suppose that the clause covers one of his ''what if?'' situations.
 The Minister mentioned that under a tree preservation order, the owner of the tree may fell or prune it if it is has become dangerous or is subject to a woodland management scheme. I wonder whether in new clause 12, relating to section 211 of the principal Act, which is about trees in a conservation area, the two same provisions apply. I have never considered the matter before, but it is an interesting question. I suspect that they probably do, but the Act does not say so. I would be grateful for the Minister's clarification of that . If he needs a bit of inspiration, no doubt he will get it—and if he needs further inspiration, no doubt he will write to the Committee.

Sydney Chapman: As I understand the position, all trees in a conservation area are subject to special arrangements. They do not necessarily have to be subject to tree preservation orders, although some do. If anyone wants to make material changes to a tree, such as chop it down, they must give the local planning authority six weeks' notice of their intention to do so. That was the period mentioned by the Minister. The local planning authority then has six weeks to decide whether to impose a tree preservation order—in other words, whether planning permission must be applied for. Of course, if it does not give an answer, the tree can be cut. I hope that that helps my hon. Friend.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: Yes. Section 211 (3)(b)(ii) says exactly that, so that is helpful. The Act does not make it clear whether the same provisions apply to tree preservation orders, which would mean that a tree owner may lop, top or even fell a tree that is diseased or dangerous in any way. It is unclear whether those defences apply with conservation orders.
 It is worth asking the Minister where the word ''emanation'' of the Crown originated. I think that the word is right, but it is odd. What precedent is there for its use? I know that Government draftsmen are great advocates of using precedent, and I wonder if there is one in another Act. I looked up the word in the Oxford English Dictionary, which says that it means to issue from or originate from. I assume that it is the right word, but I would like some clarification from the Minister.

Keith Hill: I shared the hon. Gentleman's bewilderment about that expression when I was reading through the Bill in preparation for the Committee. I asked officials and received the explanation that the emanation of the Crown is someone acting under the umbrella of the Crown, and covers all persons acting for or on behalf of the Crown. The note goes on to say that it is a feature of counsel's drafting style to use this formulation. I imagine that there is a precedent in other legislation—[Interruption.] Inspiration has arrived.
 The debate has clearly distinguished the representative of the Cotswolds—and, for that matter, the representative of Chipping Barnet, which I know embraces the beautiful Hadley wood—from me as the representative for Streatham. I suspect that I operate in a somewhat more urban context than other members of the Committee. 
 I agree with the helpful intervention by the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet. Inspiration has winged its way to me, and it tells me that section 211 applies to tree preservation orders in conservation areas that are not subject to tree preservation orders. Normal tree preservation provisions apply to those trees that have them—[Interruption.]. The hon. Member for Cotswold was too kind, and I think that I will avail myself of his generous offer to write to the Committee.

Sydney Chapman: It is a great pleasure to serve once again under your chairmanship, Mr. Pike. I am grateful to the Minister for his clarification of new clause 13. I have a particular interest in tree preservation orders—not a financial interest, I hasten to add—as I was the instigator of national tree year back in 1973. This year is the 30th anniversary—and when I come to think about it, it is probably the only useful thing that I have ever done in my political life. That was succeeded by annual national tree weeks. I have taken a particular interest in trees, although I never qualified as an arboriculturist. However, I have been president of the Arboricultural Association—and I think it took me six weeks to find out how to spell the word.
 I could have mentioned the next issue in debates on previous amendments, or on amendments yet to be discussed. It relates to Government new clauses 42 and 43, and concerns Scotland. I do not want a reply from the Minister now, but in due course I would like to receive a letter from him about this Parliament's powers over the Parliament in Scotland. The Government assure us with pride that, as part of the devolution plans fulfilled by the Scotland Act 1998 and the creation of a Scottish Parliament—and by the Government of Wales Act 1998 and the creation of the National Assembly for Wales—we are devolving powers to that country and to that Principality. 
 That is all well and good, although some powers have not been devolved, such as defence and foreign affairs and so on—I need not go through an exhaustive list. However, it is with pride that the Government talk about education, health, housing and, as I understand it, town and country planning. If town and country planning and powers in other Acts affected by the Bill such as the listed buildings Act have been devolved, what right do the Government have to introduce new clauses 42 and 43? I presume that they have the right—they will have been advised by their legal experts—but it is wrong for them to say that the Scottish Parliament or the Welsh Assembly now have control over their town and country planning Acts and regulations. This is a genuine request on my part; I do not know the answer. It would be not only in my interest but in the interest of all Members—of the House of Commons, the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly—for us to be told the answer. 
 Have we the authority to put those clauses in the Bill? If we have, will the Government please admit that the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly do not have control over town and country planning matters?

Keith Hill: Not for the first time, the hon. Gentleman tempts the Committee into areas where it
 is dangerous to tread. I am aware of the delicacy of the relationship between this Parliament and the Scottish Parliament. Some matters are reserved to the UK Parliament. The hon. Gentleman asks what right we have to amend legislation that relates to Scotland. The Scottish Parliament inherited from the UK Parliament a huge body of legislation that is still in force and which, therefore, remains the property of this Parliament. It is appropriate that this Parliament should amend such legislation where necessary, although I reiterate the assurance that I offered earlier: all the changes are made after consultation with the Scottish Parliament and with its agreement. The amendments will be the subject of a motion in the Scottish Parliament to allow the legislation to take effect in Scotland. Wales, which is represented on this Committee, is covered by the Bill because planning legislation for Wales is made in Westminster.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: Before the Minister finishes speaking, may I ask another question? Although this is enabling legislation to allow the Scottish Parliament to bring the provisions into force, it could be that, having debated the matter and voted on it, it refused to bring it into Scottish law. May I have absolute clarification of that matter?

Keith Hill: I am sure that I can offer the hon. Gentleman that clarification—but I think that if I did, other colleagues might be tempted to seek further clarification. I shall be only too delighted to offer that clarification—in the fulness of time.

Andrew Turner: It would certainly help if the Minister got all his clarifications in at the end.

Keith Hill: You are too kind.

Andrew Turner: I wonder why, in response to my hon. Friend, the Minister did not say that a particular section of the Scotland Act provides that certain matters are the province of the Scottish Parliament, and that because it does not provide that tree preservation orders are a matter for the Scottish Parliament, they remain a matter for Westminster? Given that he did not say that, I assume either that he does not know the relevant section—I confess that I do not know it either—or that a subject as minute as tree preservation orders is not exempt from the Scotland Act. Introducing a curious system of dual responsibility whereby we legislate and the Scottish Parliament votes on whether to accept our legislation, he is promoting an entirely novel interpretation of the devolution settlement. Could he give us his basis for that assertion?

Keith Hill: I qualified my response to the debate by saying that I was aware that I was moving into tricky waters, and the way in which the debate has developed has borne that out. I regret that I have no intention—hon. Members will understand why—of opining here and now upon the force and content of the Scotland Act. To be precise in response to the hon. Member for Isle of Wight, I have no idea whether tree preservation orders form part of the Scotland Act; I strongly suspect not. However, the answer to the question
 asked by the hon. Member for Cotswold about whether the Scottish Parliament could refuse to ratify the proposals is: technically, yes it could.

Sydney Chapman: I am most grateful. I was not necessarily inviting the Minister to deal with the problem immediately, so I am all the more impressed with him for having endeavoured to do so. Whatever my views are on devolution and certain aspects of town and country planning laws and regulations—and I accept that the people of Scotland want their planning legislation to be more or less in line with that of England and Wales—surely it would be in the interests of good public relations between our Parliament and the Scottish Parliament if we did not try to change their law here and now, but they proposed amending laws as a result of whatever laws we passed here, if they believed that it was logical for them to do so.
 I am genuinely trying to help the Government by pointing out to them that they seem to be going about things in the wrong way. Scottish people are very sensitive—although I accept that there are very sensitive people in all corners of our kingdom; indeed, no one could be more sensitive than me. If they have responsibility for town and country planning, we should not dictate to them what they should do but should leave it to their good sense to realise the value of copying our legislation when we seek to amend it.

Keith Hill: I hear what the hon. Gentleman says, but I assure him that we do not dictate to the Scottish Parliament. As I said, technically it is absolutely open to the Scottish Parliament to reject the amendments that we have made to this Bill in this Parliament. On the whole, it seems to me that the procedure that the hon. Gentleman describes is what is actually implemented—[Interruption.] My Parliamentary Private Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, North (Mr. Rooney), has wisely advised me to stop digging, and that is what I intend to do.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 13 - Trees in conservation areas: acts of Crown

'After section 211(4) of the principal Act (preservation of trees in conservation areas) there are inserted the following subsections— 
 ''(5) An emanation of the Crown must not, in relation to a tree to which this section applies, do an act mentioned in subsection (1) above unless— 
 (a) the first condition is satisfied, and 
 (b) either the second or third condition is satisfied. 
 (6) The first condition is that the emanation serves notice of an intention to do the act (with sufficient particulars to identify the tree) on the local planning authority in whose area the tree is situated. 
 (7) The second condition is that the act is done with the consent of the authority. 
 (8) The third condition is that the act is done— 
 (a) after the end of the period of six weeks starting with the date of the notice, and 
 (b) before the end of the period of two years starting with that date.''.'.—[Keith Hill.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 14 - Crown application: transitional

'Schedule (Transitional provisions: Crown application) (which makes transitional provisions in consequence of the application to the Crown of the planning Acts) has effect.'.—[Keith Hill.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 15 - Old mining permissions

'(1) Subsection (2) applies if— 
 (a) an old mining permission relates to land which is Crown land, and 
 (b) the permission has not been registered in pursuance of Schedule 2 to the Planning and Compensation Act 1991. 
 (2) Section 22 of and Schedule 2 to that Act apply to the old mining permission subject to the following modifications— 
 (a) in section 22(3) for ''May 1, 1991'' there is substituted ''the date of commencement of section (Old mining permissions)(2) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2003''; 
 (b) in paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 2 for ''the day on which this Schedule comes into force'' there is substituted ''the date of commencement of section (Old mining permissions)(2) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2003''. 
 (3) Old mining permission must be construed in accordance with section 22 of the Planning and Compensation Act 1991. 
 (4) Crown land must be construed in accordance with Part 13 of the principal Act.'.—[Keith Hill.]
 Brought up, and read the First time.

Keith Hill: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Peter Pike: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Government new clause 44—Old mining permissions: Scotland. 
 Government amendments Nos. 51 and 52.

Keith Hill: I find this aspect of the Bill especially interesting. New clause 15 deals with a limited category of old mining permissions that were created by wartime interim development orders between 1943 and 1948 and regularised in the Town and Country Planning Act 1947. A special scheme was established in the Planning and Compensation Act 1991 to provide for the registration of those old permissions and for the approval of appropriate new operating conditions. Because Crown immunity applied to the 1991 Act, there is a possibility, albeit a remote one, that there may be permissions on Crown land that have never been registered or made subject to the requirement to apply for, and have determined, an appropriate modern scheme of working conditions. The new clause therefore restarts the clock for this class of permissions by substituting the date of commencement of this Bill, when enacted, for the essential date specified in the 1991 Act.
 Government amendments Nos. 51 and 52 follow on from the new clause. Old mining permissions reviewed 
 under the 1991 Act are then subject to later reviews at 15-year intervals under schedule 14 to the Environment Act 1995. That Act was not subject to Crown immunity, but it remains necessary to amend it to deal with the possibility that the Crown exemption under the 1991 Act was misapplied. It allows any modern working conditions erroneously applied to mineral sites on Crown land to be redetermined correctly. This could have happened if the permission were held by a leaseholder who registered the permission not realising that the Crown was exempt. We therefore need to provide for redetermination. 
 I fully confess that I do not expect that many, if any, permissions will fall under the scope of the amendments, but it is impossible to be sure. My Department will contact other Departments and Crown bodies with a possible interest to alert them to the provision and to the time limits that it contains. 
 New clause 44 makes the same changes to Scottish planning legislation as new clause 15. It is thought that the changes in amendments Nos. 51 and 52 are to some extent already dealt with in existing Scottish planning legislation. However, the Scottish Executive are considering what further amendments might be needed to give effect to the policy intention, which is the same for Scotland.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: On a point of clarification on new clause 15, as I understand it, the new clause comes into effect on the commencement of the relevant provisions in the Bill. Therefore, while I take the Minister's point that there are unlikely to be any extant mines in that situation, it seems that if there were, and if the provisions were to apply to them, the time scale would be very short. How is the Minister to alert all the bodies that might possibly be able to take advantage of the provision?
 Can the Minister clarify why amendment No. 51 does not follow the format that is in the legislation? It seems particularly odd that it is changing the format, because amendment No. 52 follows the same format. Can the Minister explain why amendment No. 51 is needed? I am not clear what amendments Nos. 51 and 52 do. It seems that they, too, relate to the outstanding mineral permissions. I would be grateful for clarification as to the first review date and the time scale for the application of the provisions.

Keith Hill: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for asking a couple of pertinent questions, which I hope to answer. It is an interesting subject. We are working in the dark with regard to old mining permissions. We do not know whether there are any such permissions relating to our Departments or to Crown land, the Crown estates, the Royal household, or the Duchies of Lancaster and Cornwall. Nor do we know whether any were incorrectly registered and gained new conditions when the Crown exemption applied. It is possible that mineral leaseholders might have done that not realising that the landowner had Crown exemption. Minerals are frequently worked by leaseholders and they hold the permissions. If that is the case, we might need to provide for redetermination if new conditions under the law, as amended, are required. We have therefore provided a general order-
 making power that we can use if we find any outstanding problems. It is a safety net, because we are dealing with a theoretical situation and cannot anticipate issues that might arise.

Andrew Turner: Will the Minister help me out? He spoke of mineral workings on Crown land. I assume that that includes mineral workings beneath Crown land. As he knows, the sea bed is the property of the Crown and many coal mines extend beneath the sea bed.

Terry Rooney: None that are still working.

Andrew Turner: Some that are working and some that are not. Can the Minister tell me to what distance beyond the low tide mark the legislation applies?

Keith Hill: The hon. Gentleman has been most inventive in the course of the Committee. I have an idea as to the answer. Let me tentatively flag up that it might be the exclusion zone claimed by the UK and most other countries, which extends for 200 miles from the coastline. The hon. Gentleman will recall that that was confirmed by the United Nations law of the sea conference in the mid–1970s. Is that correct?

Terry Rooney: Yes.

Keith Hill: That is my offering, though I do not claim that it is necessarily correct; I might be advised differently in due course. The hon. Member for Cotswold asked a couple of questions. One was about how I would seek to inform those with an interest. As I have said, we would certainly be in touch with other Departments and with the Crown to ask them to check whether they had any record of such matters and, if so, to alert the appropriate parties. It is conceivable that our own exchanges on the matter might receive wider currency. This Standing Committee is followed avidly by the mass media, and they might provide another means of communicating the information.
 The hon. Member for Cotswold asked about commencement. There is no problem with the time scale; the measure will be brought into force by the commencement order. The first review date is 15 years from the date of determination of the commission of the conditions. Finally, he asked about the style of amendment No. 51. It is a paving amendment—we have seen similar amendments in the course of our proceedings—to change the existing provisions of the Bill to accommodate the addition of amendment No. 52. I hope that that satisfies the hon. Gentleman.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I am still not entirely clear. The nefarious, well-disguised Crown bodies that might have the extant mines somewhere within their portfolios having been found, how long will new clause 15 remain in operation? Will it continue for ever more or will there be a cut-off date by which, if the mines have not come forward, it will cease to have effect?

Keith Hill: Coal mines are already covered by the planning Acts. As to the duration of new clause 15,
 perhaps that is a matter on which I can write to the hon. Gentleman.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 16 - Subordinate legislation

'(1) The Secretary of State may by order provide that relevant subordinate legislation applies to the Crown. 
 (2) The order may modify such subordinate legislation to the extent that the Secretary of State thinks appropriate for the purposes of its application to the Crown. 
 (3) Relevant subordinate legislation is an instrument which— 
 (a) is made under or (wholly or in part) for the purposes of any of the planning Acts, 
 (b) is made before the commencement of section (Crown application of planning Acts) of this Act, and 
 (c) is specified in the order.'.—[Keith Hill.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 17 - Assessment of compensation: valuation date

'(1) The Land Compensation Act 1961 (c.33) is amended as follows. 
 (2) After section 5 there is inserted— 
 ''5A Relevant valuation date 
 (1) If the value of land is to be assessed in accordance with rule (2) in section 5, the valuation must be made as at the relevant valuation date. 
 (2) No adjustment is to be made to the valuation in respect of anything which happens after the relevant valuation date. 
 (3) If the land is the subject of a notice to treat, the relevant valuation date is the earlier of— 
 (a) the date when the acquiring authority enters on and takes possession of the land, and 
 (b) the date when the assessment is made. 
 (4) If the land is the subject of a general vesting declaration, the relevant valuation date is the earlier of— 
 (a) the vesting date, and 
 (b) the date when the assessment is made, 
 and ''general vesting declaration'' and ''vesting date'' have the meanings given in section 2 of the Compulsory Purchase (Vesting Declarations) Act 1981. 
 (5) If the acquiring authority enters on and takes possession of part of the land— 
 (a) specified in a notice of entry, or 
 (b) in respect of which a payment into court has been made, 
 the authority is deemed, for the purposes of subsection (3)(a), to have entered on and taken possession of the whole of that land on that date. 
 (6) Subsection (5) also applies for the purposes of calculating interest under the following enactments— 
 (a) section 11(1) of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965; 
 (b) paragraph 3 of Schedule 3 to that Act; 
 (c) section 85 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845; 
 (d) section 52A of the Land Compensation Act 1973, 
 and references there to the date or time of entry are to be construed accordingly. 
 (7) An assessment by the Lands Tribunal is treated as being made on the date certified by the Tribunal as— 
 (a) the last hearing date before it makes its determination, or 
 (b) in a case to be determined without an oral hearing, the last date for making written submissions before it makes its determination. 
 (8) Nothing in this section affects— 
 (a) any express provision in any other enactment which requires the valuation of land subject to compulsory acquisition to be made at a particular date; 
 (b) the valuation of land for purposes other than the compulsory acquisition of that land (even if the valuation is to be made in accordance with the rules in section 5). 
 (9) In this section— 
 (a) a notice of entry is a notice under section 11(1) of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965; 
 (b) a payment into court is a payment into court under Schedule 3 to that Act or under section 85 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845.''.'.—[Keith Hill.]
 Brought up, and read the First time.

Keith Hill: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
 With this new clause, we return to consideration of the compulsory purchase provisions of the Bill. The new clause is one of several that are intended to clarify or to amend the current compulsory purchase system in order to make it clearer and fairer. As the Committee is aware, the Bill contains various provisions on compulsory purchase in clauses 73 to 77. Clause 73 clarifies the purposes for which local planning authorities can exercise their compulsory purchase powers, while clauses 74 to 77 introduce a new element of compensation for loss. We shall, no doubt, return to those if time permits. 
 New clauses 17 to 21 concern the operation of the compulsory purchase processes. They form part of a wider package of reforms described in our policy statement of 18 July 2001 with a view to creating a simpler, fairer and faster compulsory purchase system. 
 Turning to the substance of new clause 17, the introduction of a new section 5A to the Land Compensation Act 1961 is intended to clarify the legal position as to the point in time at which land being compulsorily acquired is to be identified and valued for compensation purposes. The uncertainty has arisen as a result of conflicting case law. By removing that uncertainty, we hope that those having their property compulsorily acquired will find the negotiation for compensation to be quicker and fairer. 
 Subsections (3) and (4) of new section 5A will determine the date on which land and buildings that are being compulsorily acquired are to be valued. The valuation will reflect the nature, condition and market value of the land on that date. In the case of land being acquired through the notice to treat procedure, the date on which the land is to be valued for compensation purposes will be the date on which the acquiring authority enters the land and takes possession. A notice to treat informs the recipient of the acquiring authority's intention to acquire land and requests details of the recipient's interest in the land. The notice also invites the recipient to enter into negotiations—to treat—for the purchase of the land. The authority then has three years in which to take possession of the land. Alternatively, the authority can 
 obtain a right of entry by paying into court the sum claimed by the owner and by giving a bond that it will pay the full amount ultimately agreed or awarded to the claimant plus interest. 
 If the acquiring authority chooses to use the general vesting declaration method of taking possession of land, the relevant date for valuation purposes will be the date on which title to the land vests in the acquiring authority. This method is an alternative to the notice to treat procedure and it has the advantage to the acquiring authority of enabling it to acquire legal title to the land in the shortest possible time. 
 The only exceptions to the valuation date falling on the dates to which I referred are, in the case of both the notice to treat and general vesting procedures, where the compensation payable has already been assessed at an earlier date by the Lands Tribunal or where the parties have agreed a figure for compensation between them. The tribunal will normally become involved in compulsory purchase compensation cases only where the parties cannot agree the compensation to be paid. The date of its decision will then not be until some time after the authority has taken possession by either the notice to treat or the general vesting declaration route. The new provisions take account of the fact that the acquiring authority and the claimant may refer the matter to the tribunal at an earlier stage. Of course, it remains open to the parties to agree the compensation to be paid at any time during the compulsory purchase process. 
 I have mentioned that the date on which an acquiring authority enters and takes possession of land can be up to three years after service of a notice to treat on the owner and others with interests in the land. During that time, property prices may of course have changed considerably, as may the nature and condition of the land and buildings to be acquired. The purpose of clarifying the valuation date by legislation is therefore not only to provide certainty but to ensure that what is paid to the owner reflects property prices at the time he is being displaced and needs to find a replacement property. It will also prevent double compensation being paid—for example, if accidental damage were to occur to the property following service of the notice to treat for which he was entitled to receive insurance compensation. 
 Subsection (5) of proposed new section 5A also provides that the relevant valuation date for the whole of the land included in a notice of entry is to be the date on which the acquiring authority first takes possession of any part of the area. That means that compensation becomes payable to the claimant from the earlier date, so enabling him to negotiate meaningfully for a replacement site. In addition, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (6), he will be entitled to receive interest on the compensation due to him in respect of the value of the whole of the land to be acquired, pursuant to the notice of entry, from the date on which that first part of his land is taken until full payment is made. 
 The provisions offer a fairer way of dealing with compensation payable under the compulsory purchase procedure.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I was not looking forward to this part of the Bill, because it deals with a pretty difficult subject. Only those with an everyday involvement in compulsory purchase have a good working knowledge of it. I have not been involved in it for a long time.
 I welcome the Minister's explanation and his clarification of the relevant valuation date. The law is at present confused on the subject, but new clause 17 appears to clear up case law. For example, in the 1991 case of Hughes v. Doncaster metropolitan borough council, in All England Law Reports No. 295, it was stated that the value of land includes both its market value and any compensation for disturbance. This is a difficult concept. People often get wind of compulsory purchases and various speculative developers buy up the land with a view to increasing its value merely because it is about to be compulsorily acquired. 
 A case from 1955—Lambe v. Secretary of State for War, heard in the Queen's bench division and recorded in All England Law Reports No. 386—clearly states that the increase in value due to the scheme is never to be taken into account. It seems that there is some confusion. Indeed, in some notable cases speculators have bought land and made a considerable profit as a result. Although the new clause provides some clarification, I am not sure that it entirely deals with the matter. Nor am I sure how one could do so, because of speculation about compulsory purchase orders long before they are made. I do not know how we can prevent such speculation, but I would welcome further clarification. 
 I am not entirely clear as to when one would go down the route of notice to treat and when to go down the route of general vesting. I presume that the notice to treat route is an earlier occurrence and therefore less likely to be subject to the speculation that I have described than the vesting route. General vesting occurs when the acquiring authority takes possession; notice to treat occurs when the acquiring authority starts discussion of that land. Again, that gives manipulative speculators the chance to make money at the state's expense, which is not desirable. 
 I welcome the clarification in new clause 18 on exactly whose interest in land can be taken into account.

Peter Pike: Order. We are not discussing new clause 18 at the moment.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: Thank you, Mr. Pike. I may well come back to the Minister once he has clarified those points.Matthew Green: I welcome the clarification on the date, which there was good reason to seek as the hon. Member for Cotswold said. However, my reading of the provisions leaves one unresolved issue on which I am sure the Minister will quickly put my mind at rest.
 New section 5A(5) says: 
''If the acquiring authority enters on and takes possession of part of the land . . . the authority is deemed, for the purposes of subsection (3)(a), to have entered on and taken possession of the whole of that land on that date.''
 I am having a bad attack of the whatiferies, rather as the Minister did earlier, which I stayed well out of. I 
 can foresee a situation where a local authority decides to take part of a landowner's land, but then six months down the line decides that it is going to extend the scheme that it is bringing forward and take a further part of that landowner's land. I am concerned that the local authority could claim it had previously taken possession of part of that land, and that therefore the date of the valuation was the earlier date, even though the authority had no intent at that time of taking the land later. 
 I am clearly describing a what-if situation, but it is not entirely implausible that a local authority would acquire further land, discover that it needs to amend its scheme and thus acquire even further land. Since the local authority would have a new intent, the second date should be taken into account rather than the first.

Sydney Chapman: I dare to enter the debate on the new clause for just one reason, on which the Minister can perhaps help me. The new clause is clearly technical, immensely specialist and incredibly important. There cannot be a much more important issue than the assessment of compensation value in certain spheres of government.
 As I said earlier, the original Bill was a fast-track Bill, but it then went into the railways sidings for a few months. It has now come out with new carriages and important appendages that we must consider. Frankly, I am not competent to deal with the problem and could not begin to have the expertise to do so. I hope that I am not slandering any colleague on the Committee, but I doubt whether anybody else here could either. However, I would be at least partly reassured if I could be told that on this new clause and one or two to come, which I cannot mention, the Government have consulted relevant organisations or institutions, interested parties or parties that are likely to be affected. 
 I could support the new clause in good faith only if I could be assured that the Government have consulted. A worry is that it was suddenly produced for public inspection just a few weeks ago, if not a few days ago. It is in the interests of democracy that these specialist organisations write to Members on both sides of the Committee to say that they have an interest in this matter and that they would like us to advocate it, and that they have had an opportunity to consider the proposals, so that we could then be asked to pass legislation in which we may fairly and reasonably have confidence.

Andrew Turner: I am glad that my hon. Friend has admitted what I believe was going through many of our minds—that we are baffled by the Minister's explanation of what the clause is trying to do. I am certainly baffled. I suppose that the opposite of ''whatifery'' is anecdotalism. I shall therefore go for anecdotalism, because at least that provides me with a firm example. would then be of use to me if the Minister could at least try to deal with it.
 My hon. Friend the Member for Cotswold suggested that a consequence of an imminent compulsory purchase order is that the price of the 
 value of the land can be pushed up. An alternative consequence of an imminent compulsory purchase order is that the value of the land can be depressed. That is particularly the case with agricultural land and with land that is likely to be purchased for highways. 
 I know of a case in which the ombudsman found a local authority wrongly to have given planning permission for a particular agricultural development, which led to serious damage to neighbouring housing. The ombudsman ordered that compensation should be paid to the residents of that housing, which the local authority decided that it did not want to pay. Instead, it tried to extinguish the planning permission. For reasons best known to itself, it did not go down the route of the revocation order and compensation, but decided instead to buy by compulsory purchase the land on which the development had taken place. The whole process began in 1998 and is still going on. The farmer is a dairy farmer who has seen the value of his herd reduced significantly over that time, yet he has not been able to transfer his business to a longer-term agricultural prospect, as neighbouring dairy farmers have, because he has no guarantee that he will have any land on which to operate in the long term. 
 We have never reached the point, and I suspect that we never will, where the compulsory purchase order is confirmed—at least, not unless we hand the power to confirm compulsory purchase orders to local authorities, which we may do further down the line. However, I am sure that the Minister will accept that the value of the land has been severely depressed because of the blight of this ill-considered and ill-founded compulsory purchase order. 
 When discussing whatever these terms mean, it is entirely immaterial whether we talk about a general vesting declaration or, in this case, the notice to treat. The fact of the matter is that the value of the land has declined over five or six years and the farmer is still unsure in which direction he should go. He has done all sorts of things to try to resolve the issue, including applying for planning permission for housing on the land in question, which the local authority rejected. It is widely believed that the local authority wanted to buy the land for housing purposes. 
 Will the Minister clarify for my benefit, if for no one else's, how these different terms—notice to treat and vesting declaration—would apply if that compulsory purchase order had gone through and if a price had to be fixed?

Keith Hill: I believe that we all sense that we are dabbling in deep waters with this new clause. We have all expressed a certain amount of caution. I fully vouchsafe my own caution in dealing with such issues.
 Let me attempt to deal with the questions raised by the hon. Member for Cotswold about speculation and the anecdotal case of changes in the value of land. The Committee now has another expression: after ''whatifery'' we have ''anecdotalism''. It is difficult for me, in my quasi-judicial capacity, to comment on a particular case, but let me say on the question of how changes in circumstances affect the compensation offered that the compensation is assessed on open-market value, ignoring speculation that may have 
 resulted from the proposal. How does that prevent speculative gain? It appears that valuation techniques are capable of stripping back in such cases to the original value in what is described as a no-scheme world. I honestly do not know whether the technique would be applicable in the case of the farmer that was cited by the hon. Member for Isle of Wight, but I suggest that it may be a path worth pursuing. I certainly understand the difficulties of the individual concerned. 
 The hon. Member for Cotswold asked about the effects of a notice to treat under a general vesting declaration. The vesting declaration is a much quicker way of getting title to land that is in unknown ownership, as in the case that he cited. As I indicated earlier, the notice to treat method leaves an opportunity to identify ownership of a period of up to three years. 
 The hon. Member for Ludlow asked about the situation that would arise with the part and whole, a concept that is a very reasonable proposition. He asked what would happen to the compensation payable if a local planning authority decided to extend the area of compulsory purchase. The answer is as I had expected: entry on to a part of land applies only if a notice of entry has been served on the whole of the land, but it only takes a part. It does not apply to later notices of entry. Therefore, the compensation applies to the order that has been served and not to any later order. That seems entirely reasonable, and we seem to have agreement on it across the Floor. 
 The hon. Member for Chipping Barnet rightly alluded to the complexities of the provisions. He said that he would feel more confident in embracing them if he were satisfied that a proper process of consultation had been associated with them. I hope that I can carry him with me on the proposals when I tell him that there certainly has been a very thorough process of consultation. The compulsory purchase policy review advisory group, which comprises external experts on the matters, recommended exactly the proposals in a report published in 2000. The Government took account of its comments in the Green Paper of December 2001 and the comments received on that in our policy statement of 18 July 2002. I should enter a slight qualification to what I said. I said that the report recommended ''exactly the proposals'', but it is the gravity of the proposals that were put forward by the external group of experts. They have been further consulted on during the development of the Green Paper and the consultation following the July 2002 policy statement. 
 The proposals have been subject to a pretty thorough consultation process. External experts are with us on this and, on that basis, I am more than content to commend these fair proposals to the Committee.

Sydney Chapman: I am grateful to the Minister and reassured by his comments. At the risk of being out of order, could he say whether the external group was also consulted on new clauses 19, 20 and 21? If he could say that—if not now, then later—that would help the Committee.

Keith Hill: I can respond to that immediately by saying the advisory group was further consulted on most of the proposals.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I want to press the Minister a little further on the last subject that was raised. I am confused about what was supposed to be in this Bill and what is supposed to be in the next compulsory purchase Bill, which I believe will deal with subjects recommended by the Law Commission. I pressed the former Minister, now the Under-Secretary of State for Transport, the hon. Member for Harrow, East (Mr. McNulty) on that. Will the Minister now comment on how these provisions came to be in this Bill and how they differ from what will be in the subsequent Bill? Will he also confirm that new clause 17 in no way alters the provisions about disturbance and injurious affection?

Peter Pike: Order. Before I call the Minister, I should say that we should be careful that we do not get too far along in discussing what may or may not appear in other Bills later this year.

Keith Hill: I am happy to take your advice on that, Mr. Pike. My initial reaction was that the hon.
 Member for Cotswold knows a lot more than me about those matters. The Law Commission is examining a range of property issues, including that of tenure, but it would be premature to suggest or assume that a further compulsory purchase Bill is envisaged at this stage. I hope that that reply complies with your request, Mr. Pike.
 I want again to offer assurance to the Committee about the source of the proposals on compulsory purchase. They were proposed by the expert group to which I have referred. On the issue of injurious affection and disturbance, I hope that the Committee will indulge me if I say that that is another matter on which I could reasonably write to the hon. Gentleman. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill. 
 Further consideration adjourned.—[Paul Clark.] 
 Adjourned accordingly at sixteen minutes to Seven o'clock till Thursday 16 October at ten minutes past Nine o'clock.